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## REVIEWS AND ABSTRACTS OF LITERATURE

*Essays in Experimental Logic.* JOHN DEWEY. Chicago: University of Chicago Press. 1916. Pp. vii + 444.

The essays brought together in this volume are the four essays originally appearing in the *Studies in Logical Theory* (1903) "with editorial revisions, mostly omissions," and other studies "in part reprinted and in part rewritten, with additions." These latter include "Some Stages of Logical Thought," written before the *Studies in Logical Theory*, "The Logical Character of Ideas," "The Control of Ideas by Facts," "Naïve Realism *versus* Representative Realism," "Epistemological Realism: The Alleged Ubiquity of the Knowledge Relation," "The Existence of the World as a Logical Problem," "What Pragmatism Means by Practical," "An Added Note as to the Practical," "The Logic of Judgments of Practise," and an "Introduction," especially written for the volume. This "Introduction" comprises about one sixth of the whole.

The fact that the edition of the *Studies* has been exhausted seems to have been the occasion that led, happily, to the bringing together of these studies of Professor Dewey's that would otherwise have remained comparatively inaccessible in the files of technical periodicals. Together, they furnish a basis for the study of the most profound working out that pragmatism as a philosophy has yet had, and to the historian there is the added interest of observing the ripening, through more than thirteen years, of thought that was at least enigmatical to those of professional philosophic training at the time when the nucleal studies first appeared. Unfortunately the author has seen fit to omit from the republished studies references to the dates and places of their original publication.

In the later writings the terminology seems somewhat softened, although the term "experience" as here used will still be a stumbling-block to some, but the development of and interest in behavioristic psychology has done much to illuminate the author's point of view. If the reader turns from the review of James's *Pragmatism*, "What Pragmatism Means by Practical," to the essay on the "Logic of Judgments of Practise," he can not fail to be impressed with the sure touch and the increased breadth of analysis of the latter. Whereas at first Professor Dewey seems "to grope about an idea and feel of it on all sides," to parody an expression of his own, he now turns on the searchlight and boldly walks around it, taking flashlights or making maps and drawings as the occasion requires.

What Professor Dewey's critics need to dwell upon is his psychology, the psychology of behaviorism. With this psychology his thought stands or falls. If we once grant that sensations "are not

elements out of which perceptions are composed, constituted, or constructed," but that "they are the finest, most carefully discriminated objects of perception" (p. 404) the rest follows inevitably as we read on in the language of facts. On this basis the puzzles of subjectivism are gone, for while we have the individualism that is the result of differently constituted organisms responding differently to the same external situation, there is no more mystery, privacy, or subjectivity in the fact than in the case where different makes of golf-balls respond differently to similar strokes. It is the earnest hope of the reviewer that these and sundry other problems (?) may soon vanish from philosophic writing, especially the "bent stick" (pp. 396-97), concerning which Professor Dewey's interpretation seems adequate and final until his psychology is demonstrated false. *Absit omen.*

The first and hitherto unpublished part of the book begins with an emphasis of the temporal development of experience and a distinction between its reflectional and non-reflectional types (pp. 1-8). There follows a condensed exposition of the process of thinking, as set forth in *How We Think*, in which is included the illuminating comment that "Thinking gets no farther, as *thinking*, than a statement of elements constituting the difficulty at hand and a statement—a propounding, a proposition—of a method for resolving them" (p. 13). To get knowledge this must be tried out and if the required organization is effected, the results of the thinking become knowledge (pp. 8-18). The next two sections consist of a careful exposition of the contrast between the concept of logic here developed and that of idealism and of the new realism (pp. 18-35). Realism then comes in for careful criticism, but the author's own view gets much incidental clarification with respect to the nature of *abstractions*, as something "really there," and *data*, as materials extracted for the purpose of guiding inference (pp. 35-46). *Meanings* are given a much more thorough analysis than in the author's previous writings, not only in their objectivity, but in their functioning. This leads to some admirable suggestions as to the nature of words (p. 51), the instrumental interpretation of deduction (p. 53), and the philosophy of mathematics (p. 55) (pp. 46-61). The final section recurs to the significance of the term experience in the history of philosophy as "coincident with the emancipation of science from occult essences and causes, and with the substitution of methods of observation, controlled by experimentation and employing mathematical considerations, for methods of mere dialectic definition and classification." It is also significant from the close association made between the ideal and the scientific that: "If philosophers could aid in making it clear to a troubled humanity that ideals are continuous with natural events, that they but represent their possibilities, and that recognized possi-

bilities form methods for a conduct which may realize them in fact, philosophers would enforce the sense of a social calling and responsibility" (pp. 61-74).

As is inevitable in a book of this sort, there is much repetition, and the reviewer can not conceal a sense of regret that the many topics suggestively touched in the introduction could not have been expanded to form the content of the book in place of all but the last of the reprinted essays. However, to have as much material as is here brought together in a single volume from such a thinker as Professor Dewey should be no slight stimulus to American philosophy.

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*The Theory of Abstract Ethics.* THOMAS WHITTAKER. Cambridge: The University Press. 1916. Pp. viii + 126.

This little volume, which is quite as abstract (and dry) as the title suggests, advocates a mildly modified Kantianism in ethics. The author considers the fundamental achievement in that discipline to have been the substitution of the formal for the teleological point of view. The beginnings of this revolution he finds in Hobbes's *De Cive*; Kant was its protagonist; Renouvier made some contribution; and Juvalta has cleared up most of the remaining difficulties. An extended outline is given of Juvalta's *Il Vecchio e il Nuovo Problema della Morale*; to the ethical doctrine there defended our author has little to add. He calls it "rationalism modified by contact with empirical theories of ethics" (p. 66).

"What we have to determine primarily," the author agrees, "is not the good that is to be the end of action . . . but the moral law to which actions ought to conform. This moral law is not a deduction from any end, but is valid simply as law" (p. 29). His own proposal is to give to the logic of conduct deducible from this abstract moral law the name abstract ethics. Beyond its sphere there is the whole realm of ends properly pursued by men. "Concrete or applied ethics is concerned with the pursuit of good when it comes into contact with the principles of abstract ethics. By this division the defects both of the purely *a priori* and of the purely *a posteriori* systems are avoided" (p. 37).

Three arguments against teleological ethics are offered. First, we can never know the total consequences of an action, hence we can never, on teleological principles, know what is right. But we do know what is right in most cases. Therefore, the teleological explanation is inadequate. Secondly, "from the point of view of the ethics of law (to reject which would be to beg the question), since